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RECENT DECISIONS 189
been mgned to a widow, her judgment creditor ray institute proceedings to
have it auine4 so that her share of the real estate may be set apart and
levied upon by him. This stut recognizes the common law rule that a
widow's dower, which becomes cawsunzmte upon the death of her husband,
is a mere chose in action until it i assigned; Waller v. Mardus, 29 Mo. 25;
Young v. The r, 61 Mo. App. 413; Carey v. West 139 Mo. 177; 30 L P.
A. (N. S.) lo. dt. 117, sowe; and so mnnot be levied upon as real estate
by a judgmuent creditor of the widow. This statute affords the creditor an
adequate remedy If dower has not been assigned.
However, it seems in this case that the plaintiff had previously mused
execution to be Issued upon the judgment and the land to be levied upon and
sold by the sheriff at judicial sale, and also had received the proceeds oi the
sale. The court held that the sale of the widow's interest under execution,
before dower had been amdgned, was void. But it was held that the plaintiff
was estopwed to deny the validity of the sale which was in fact void because
Ie had accepted the purchase money of said sale and had uot offered to put
the purchaser in gau quo.
The commoi, law rule with regard to the transfer by the widow of her
unasigned dower has been dhanged in Missouri by sec. 316, Rev. Star- 1919,
which authorizes her to convey the dower interest before assignmeft
NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE -PECULIAR
APPLICATION.
The facts in the case of Hammack v. Payne, Agent, et al, 235 S. W.
467 (Mo.). show that while plaintiff was passing over the railroad tracks at
a highway crossing between swations of Wyeth and Rea in Andrew County,
Missouri. he was struck by a Chicago Great Western Railroad train. His
automobile was destroyed and he was seriously injured. He brought action
for $10,000 damages for his injuries. In the lower court judgment was given
for the plaintiff but in the Kansas City Court of Appeals the judgment was
reversed on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
in not looking both up and down the railroad tracks before driving thereon.
As bearing upon this case a part of the opinion of Kelsay v. Railroad, 129
Mo. loc. cit. 372, is set out :-"This duty requires him (traveler upon the high-
way) to look carefully in both directions at a convenient distance from the
crossing before verituring upon it, if by looking a train could be tem. He
cannot close his eyes and thereby relieve himself of the consequence of hit
own neglect." Upon this point there seems to be some contrariety of opinion
based on the doctrine of the "last clear chance." In the case of Nicol v.
Oregon-Washington Railroad & Nay. Co. 71 Wash. 409, plaintiff attempted
to go over a railroad crossing in an automobile but while upon the tracl the
machine became stalled. Shortly after, said machine was struck by a rail-
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road train and destroyed Plaintiff brougtt action against the railroad con-
pany for damages and recovered. The Court held that the plaintiff's negli.
gence had terminated after his engine had stalled and since .the defendant, If
he had exercised reasonable care. rmwht have aversed the accident, be also
was negigemt. Thus his act was omidered to be the proximate cause of the
damage since he had the "last clear danced of preventing it A similar vw
was held in Green v. Los Angeles Terminal lailrod Co. 143 CaL 31, where
the doctrine of the "last deear dance" was held to apply, notwithstanding the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff; the Court saying. "It applies in cases
where the defendant knowing of plaintiff's danger, and that it is obvious he
cannot extricate himself from it, fails to do something which it is in his
power to do to avoid the injury." Cases in Pennsylvania seem to support the
principal cse. Feudale v. Hines, 271 Pa. 199, a case similar to those above
mentioned held that the doctrine of the 'last dear chance" did not apply. In
Pennsylvania the rule is firmly established that a failure by the driver of a
vehicle to stop, look and listen in a substantial mnner before crossing rail-
road tracks is cotributory negligence which will be a bar to recovery. Ibrig
v. Erie Railroad Co6 210 Pa. M& By a review of other cases it will be sew
that as a general rule the dodtrine of the "last clear chance" is not applied
to cases like the one under oonsideration but rather the rule that if the de-
fendant has been guilty of contributory negligence he cannot recover. Nor-
folk & W. R. Co. v. Wilson, 90 Va. 263; O'brien v. McGlinchy, 68 Me. 552.
The cases in whicb the "last clear dance" doctrine applies seems to be thoe
in which the negligence of plaintiff has ceased before being injured by de-
fendant, which said injury would not have occurred if defendant had exercised
reasonabe care upon seeing the plaintiff in a position of danger from which
he cannot extricate himself.
POWERS--LIFE TENANT WITH POWER TO SELL AND DISPOSE
OF LAND IS NOT ENTITLED TO GIVE IT AWAY.
In Cook v. Higgin, 235 S. W. 80, a recent Missouri case, a testatoes
devise of all his propeny to his wife with power to sell and dispose of as
she saw fit and to execut deeds thereof, with remainders over of any prop-
erty undisposed of upon her death, was held to , eate a life estate in the
wife with power of sale and disposition; and rernaindrs over at her death as
provided in the will. The widow, shortly before her death, convey the farm
of 150 acres by warranty deed to her nephew in conhideration of "one dollar
and other good and valuable co.sideratom" The only other consideration
shown is an agreement between the widow and the grantee that he would live
cc the farm and care for her for the rest of her life. This agreement was
not carried out by the grantee. The court held that the consideration for the
cmveya= of the land was insufficient and that the deed to the grantee was
not a sale and disposition of the land in accordance with the provisom of
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